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Abstract The authors of mobile-malware have started
to leverage program protection techniques to circum-
vent anti-viruses, or simply hinder reverse engineering.
In response to the diffusion of anti-virus applications,
several researches have proposed a plethora of analyses
and approaches to highlight their limitations when mal-
ware authors employ program-protection techniques. An
important contribution of this work is a systematization
of the state of the art of anti-virus apps, comparing the
existing approaches and providing a detailed analysis of
their pros and cons. As a result of our systematization,
we notice the lack of openness and reproducibility that,
in our opinion, are crucial for any analysis methodology.
Following this observation, the second contribution of
this work is an open, reproducible, rigorous method-
ology to assess the effectiveness of mobile anti-virus
tools against code-transformation attacks. Our unified
workflow, released in the form of an open-source pro-
totype, comprises a comprehensive set of obfuscation
operators. It is intended to be used by anti-virus devel-
opers and vendors to test the resilience of their prod-
ucts against a large dataset of malware samples and
obfuscations, and to obtain insights on how to improve
their products with respect to particular classes of code-
transformation attacks.
Keywords Android malware detection, code obfusca-
tion
1 Introduction
Android is the most popular mobile platform with a
market share of 82.8% [6]. The application-distribution
workflow is such that Android developers can sign their
applications using self-signed certificates and publish
them through the Google Play Store or alternative mar-
ketplaces. No central, trusted certificate authority is re-
quired and, as a matter of fact, no public key infras-
tructure is implemented. This makes it relatively easy
to develop and distribute Android applications, includ-
ing malicious ones. Thus, it is not surprising that, ac-
cording to the leading security vendors and researchers,
Android is not only the most popular mobile platform,
but also the most targeted one. Indeed, threats against
Android account for 97% of the new mobile malware
discovered in the second half of 2013 [14]. This trend
was confirmed by the Symantec’s report where the au-
thors observed that 46 new families of Android malware
were discovered in 2014 [26]. Moreover, in this report,
researchers observe that malware developers are contin-
uously increasing the number of variants per family, for
example, by repackaging well-known applications with
malware.
The proliferation of malicious applications has led
to the development of a plethora of commercial anti-
malware (or anti-virus, or AV) products, distributed
as free and paid applications in the various market-
places. These detection tools typically rely on signa-
tures matching for the automatic identification of mal-
ware. A signature is a program feature extracted from
a malicious application that is meant to characterize
the malicious nature of the application. Thus, any ap-
plication that exhibits a malware signature is classified
as malicious. Given the sandboxed runtime and restric-
tive security model of Android, anti-malware have very
limited auditing capabilities. In the best case, with-
out breaking the security model (i.e., without requiring
root privileges), anti-malware products can scan appli-
cations using signatures that encode syntactic features.
2Problem Statement. Malware authors have started
to leverage several techniques, such as code obfusca-
tion, to bypass detection. Indeed, given the aforemen-
tioned limitations of Android AVs, signatures can be
easily evaded. With the term code obfuscation we re-
fer to program transformations designed specifically to
make static analysis difficult while preserving the pro-
gram’s original behavior [11]. Code obfuscation changes
the code of a program, namely how the program is writ-
ten, but not the semantics of a program, namely what
the program computes. Thus, an obfuscating transfor-
mation transforms a program into a semantically equiv-
alent one that is more difficult to analyze manually or
with automatic tools. Malware writers have widely em-
ployed offensive code-obfuscation techniques in desktop
scenarios and it is not surprising that such techniques
are nowadays ported to the mobile world. Thus, it is of
paramount importance to have rigorous methodologies
to assess the effectiveness of mobile anti-malware tools
against obfuscation. In the past, Christodorescu and
Jha [9] in their seminal paper proposed a methodology
to be applied to test the robustness of generic malware
detectors against obfuscation transformations.
Goals of this Work. In this work, we systematize
the state of the art in testing mobile malware detectors
and we propose a unified workflow that anti-malware
developers and vendors can use for (1) testing the re-
silience of their products against a large dataset of mal-
ware samples and obfuscations and (2) obtain insights
on how to improve their products with respect to par-
ticular classes of obfuscations. More precisely, our ap-
proach, called AAMO (Automatic Android Malware
Obfuscator), provides an automatic framework for the
application of existing and potentially novel obfuscat-
ing transformations to large-scale datasets of Android
malware. One goal of our testing methodology is to find
the minimal sequence of obfuscation operators, applied
according to a predefined order, that an attacker can
create to evade an anti-malware product. In particu-
lar, we fix an order of obfuscation operators and we
apply them one after the other in order to identify the
shortest sequence of obfuscation operators that causes
a false negative. Although this latter objective is sim-
ilar to that of previous work (most notably [24, 20]),
we notice a lack of well-established experimental pro-
tocols in this area, which instead is crucial for precise
reproducibility. Although we validate our approach on a
representative dataset (against the top 6 anti-malware
products), we believe that the research community de-
mands something beyond a comparative analysis or the
mere demonstration that code-obfuscation techniques
are effective. Therefore, rather than just providing a
“snapshot” of the current anti-malware situation, which
would be immediately obsolete (e.g., due to changes in
the anti-malware products or dataset, and to the devel-
opment of new obfuscation techniques), the focal point
of AAMO is to provide a future-proof methodology
and prototype that future researchers will be able to
use.
The specifics of the AAMO framework for testing
malware detectors for Android are as follows.
– Comprehensiveness.AAMO considers a large and
comprehensive pool of obfuscation operators that
includes all the obfuscations proposed in the litera-
ture for testing Android malware detectors.
– Correctness. As noted in [20], the use of certain
obfuscation operators can make an application non
functional. We consider an obfuscation operation as
“successful” only if it produces a working applica-
tion, which means that the evasion technique can be
used by a malware developer.
– Reproducibility and Fidelity. Key to any anti-
malware evaluation experiment is its reproducibil-
ity. Differently from previous work, we do not resort
to closed source or commercial products to imple-
ment our obfuscation operators. We implement all
the operators used in our experiments, and release
the source code of the prototype.
– Flexibility and Scalability. Our lightweight code
base allows new obfuscations to be implemented on
top of AAMO and plugged in the framework. More-
over, AAMO allows to combine the obfuscations
supported by the framework. AAMO can automat-
ically obfuscate a large dataset of malware samples.
– Insightfulness. The analysis of the testing results
of AAMO provides insights on how to improve the
signature used by the AV with respect to the mini-
mal combination of obfuscation operations that trig-
gers a considerable amount of false negatives.
Summary of Contributions. This paper makes the
following original contributions:
– We provide a systematization of the current state
of the art in obfuscation for mobile applications,
which can be used for benign purposes (e.g., soft-
ware protection) as well as for malicious purposes
(e.g., anti-malware evasion).
– We describe the design and implementation details
of a new, general-purpose, advanced, mobile-tailored
obfuscation tool for the Android platform.
– We presents the implementation of a framework for
easily combining obfuscation techniques in order to
obtain arbitrarily complex obfuscation transforma-
tions. The framework is fully automated, modular
and it allows us to apply obfuscation techniques to
a large-scale dataset of malware samples.
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– We provide a validation of our framework on top
of the AndroTotal research platform [19]. The main
advantage in the use of AndroTotal is that this en-
sures that the tests are performed on the unmodified
mobile anti-malware tools and reproduces the same
conditions of a malware-detection task on the end
user’s device.
– The proposed framework for testing Andorid anti-
malware tools provides insights to counteract the
specific classes of obfuscation in order to implement
future-generation anti-malware products. Indeed, we
show that AAMO can be used to identify the class
of obfuscation that breaks a given detection tool.
In the spirit of open science and for the benefit of the se-
curity of the Android ecosystem, we released a proof of
concept implementation of AAMO as fully open source
at https://github.com/necst/aamo.
Structure of the paper
In Section 2 we recall the basic background concepts
and definitions regarding the Android platform. In Sec-
tion 3 we recall the major researches published in the
area of testing Android malware detectors, together
with their limitation and current needs that motivated
our work. Next, in Section 4 we provide an overview
of our testing approach and the workflow that imple-
ments it in AAMO. Section 5 provides the details of
the obfuscating techniques that we have implemented
in AAMO, grouped into classes according to the code
features that they target. Section 6 provides an instance
of how AAMO is expected to work in a real-world use
case. We present the obtained results and discuss them
in order to provide suggestions for improving the con-
sidered AV products.
2 Android Platform
In this section we summarize the fundamental back-
ground concepts and terminology used in the paper.
2.1 Security and Runtime
The Android security model is based on application iso-
lation. More precisely, it leverages the user-based re-
source separation mechanism offered by the underly-
ing Linux kernel, in which users (along with their re-
sources, processes, etc.) are kept isolated from one an-
other. Apps are mapped one-to-one to users, and each
of them runs in an isolated sandbox. This sandbox is
implemented as an instance (i.e., process) of the Dalvik
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2.5 Building Android applications
Android applications are mainly built of Java source code, platform-specific
metadata and, eventually, some native code (through JNI, leveraging the An-
droid Native Development Kit (NDK)) and architecture-specific libraries.
The build process, as defined in Figure 2.3, can be decomposed in the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Preparation: During this early stage some resources and associated
metadata are packed in a binary file by the tool aapt [plaa], also some
Java classes and interfaces are built by the same tool.
2. Compilation: The Java source code is compiled into Java bytecode by
calling javac [java] along with the Java files created in the previous step.
3. Conversion: By calling the dx [plaa] tool, the Java bytecode retrieved
from the previous step is converted to DEX bytecode. Also the metadata
and the libraries are used in order to properly build the DEX file. Multiple
Figure 1 Android application build process.
VM, a register-based machine with a high-level instruc-
tion set. For optimized performance, Dalvik executables
(also called DEX files) can be just-in-time or ahead-of-
time compiled into the native instruction set. The latter
case have evolved into the current runtime called An-
droid RunTime (ART), which executes native instruc-
tions. To allow sandboxed applications to interact with
each other and the system, applications must decl re
the permissions that they want to use in order to c-
cess the resourc s ( .g., phone, n twork connectivity,
Bluetooth, contacts).
2.2 Development a d Deployment
Android is an operati g sys em and development plat-
form specifically designed for mobile devices such as
smartphones, tablets, infotainment systems, or similar
embedded devices. Android is build on top of Linux,
which provides an hardware abstraction layer, ensur-
ing portability to a wide range of architectures. It also
provides memory management, process management, a
security model and networking. On top of Linux, An-
droid provides a set of low-level libraries and APIs in or-
der that abstracts common tasks used by userspace ap-
plications. Android applications take advantages of an
application framework, which includes Java-compatible
libraries.
Android applications are mainly developed in Java,
with native code extensions through the Java Native In-
4terface. Applications are distributed as Android pack-
age (APK) files, which are compressed archives that
contain the compiled Dalvik bytecode (see Section 2.3),
resources (e.g., images, XML files, and other assets),
certificates, and a manifest file. The manifest file con-
tains a list of the permissions requested by the applica-
tion, which must be approved by the user upon instal-
lation.
As in any Java application, each component is en-
capsulated in a class, which can be referenced from
the manifest file. Referenced components are the en-
try points, and are used in order to interact with the
Android environment (e.g., execute a function at boot,
or upon receiving a call or text message).
In a typical Android context, only digitally signed
applications can be installed. However, the lack of a
public key infrastructure allows developers to use self-
signed certificates to sign their applications and publish
them through the Google Play Store. We consider the
idea of submitting obfuscated samples to the Google
Play Store interesting. However, since the Google Play
Store uses the AVs from VirusTotal, the state of art
work (based on VirusTotal) has already indirectly mea-
sured this aspect. There is a whole separate area dedi-
cated to measuring the resilience of Google Play Store
to the various forms of threats, and we believe our paper
is not in that scope. Applications can be also retrieved
from alternative marketplaces or directly downloaded
into devices, making the problem of applying security
checks even more complex.
The build process is summarized in Figure 1.
2.3 Bytecode and Representation
In this work we rely on an assembler-level representa-
tion of DEX instructions. To this end, we use the Smali
language, which is compact yet easy to read, and well
supported by program-analysis tools. In Smali, classes
and files are mapped one to one, and each class is con-
tained into a single Smali file named as the contained
class. The directory structure reflects the packages hi-
erarchy.
We hereby summarize the essential concepts of the
Smali syntax required to define our obfuscation tech-
niques in Section 5. Primitive types are represented by
a single letter (e.g., V for void, Z for Boolean, B for byte,
S for short). Reference types are objects and arrays,
everything else is a primitive. Objects take the form
Lpackage/name/ObjectName, where a leading L indi-
cates that it is an object type. Arrays take the form
[Type, where Type could be any type, including refer-
ence types. For arrays with multiple dimensions, mul-
tiple [ character are added. The maximum number of
dimensions is 255.
Methods are associated to the owner object using
the Owner;->MName(TypeType)Type syntax, where pa-
rameters are simply listed, with no separators.
Fields are likewise always defined using a similar
form, which refers to the owner, the field name and
its type: Owner;->Name:Ljava/lang/String. Directive
are declared with the .Directive token, and lines start-
ing with # are interpreted as comments.
The Dalvik VM has 32-bit registers that can hold
any type of value, using two adjacent registers for 64-
bit types. There are two ways to specify how many
registers are available in a method. The .registers
directive specifies the total number of registers in the
method. The .locals directive specifies the number of
non-parameter registers in the method. The total num-
ber of registers includes the registers needed to hold the
method parameters.
When a method is invoked, its parameters are placed
into the last registers. The first parameter to a non-
static method is always the object that the method
is being invoked on (this), except for static methods.
There are two naming schemes for registers: the normal
v naming scheme, and the p naming scheme for param-
eter registers. The first register in the p naming scheme
is the first parameter register in the method. Parameter
registers can be equivalently referenced by either name.
2.4 Anti-malware Approaches and Limitations
There exist several commercial anti-malware products
in response to the proliferation of malicious applica-
tions. In a traditional desktop environment, AVs appli-
cations run with administrative privileges, whereas on
Android they must run with the same privilege level of
a regular application. This restriction makes it difficult
for AV applications to perform behavioral analysis and
runtime scanning.
For this reasons Android applications are analyzed
by using the provided APIs in order to scan the content
of original APK files using static signature matching.
Signatures are based on blocks of code, data- or control-
flow graph fragments, identifiers, APIs calls sequences,
strings, manifest, resources, and assets. In some (lim-
ited) cases, AV applications opt for cloud-based scan-
ning. However, this is often reduced to pre-processing
the APK oﬄine and sending the result (e.g., hash, byte
sequences extracted) to the AV engine’s back end. In-
deed, uploading the entire APK is not always applicable
for obvious reasons (e.g., licensing issues, bandwidth,
dynamic code loaded by the application).
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2.5 Android Application Obfuscation
As part of the program-protection arsenal, code obfus-
cation is a powerful technique to render manual and
automated reverse-engineering harder. Code obfusca-
tion has been introduced for the first time in [11] as
a promising technique to prevent malicious reverse en-
gineering of programs that aims at violating the intel-
lectual property of proprietary programs. Since then,
code obfuscation has received the attention of both
software developers for the protection of the intellec-
tual property of their code (see [10] for a survey), and
malware writers for the evasion of automatic detection
tools (e.g., [18, 21]). Code obfuscation has also been
studied from a theoretical point of view in order to
prove the potentiality and limitations of this technique
(e.g., [8, 12, 13, 16]).
The Android development tool chain includes a sim-
ple, open-source program-obfuscation tool called Pro-
Guard, which removes debug symbols, normalizes iden-
tical code blocks, remove unused code, and “minifies”
the identifiers’ names. There exist a plethora of alter-
native commercial and open-source tools, which mainly
differ from one another for their scope and obfuscation
strength. For example, DexGuard is a commercial code
optimizer and obfuscator derived from ProGuard. It
provides reflection, identifier obfuscation for packages,
classes, methods, and fields, and performs strings, re-
sources, and asset and library encryption. Allatori, an-
other commercial obfuscator, provides methods to mod-
ify the control flow graph in addition to string encryp-
tion. Similarly, Klassmaster provides flow obfuscation
and string encryption. Dalvik-obfuscator and APKfus-
cator are open-source proof-of-concept obfuscators that
leverage the junk- or dead-code insertion.
Generally, the goal of these (and other) obfuscation
tools is to evade manual reverse engineering. As a con-
sequence, however, code-obfuscation tools can be used
to evade signature-based AVs because they produce a
semantically equivalent program that differs from the
original one. Indeed, according to [27], malware au-
thors have been using obfuscation for evading AV de-
tection, with both custom and commercial tools. For
example variants of the Opfak.bo and Obad.a families
were obfuscated with a commercial tool, and samples
of the SmsSend.ND!tr family (March 2014) were obfus-
cated with the aforementioned APKfuscator. According
to Fortiguard Labs [7], 17 to 27 percent of the mali-
cious samples analyzed used ProGuard or some form
of encryption, even if sometimes encryption is used in
legitimate portions. For instance, samples of the An-
droid/SmsSpy.HW!tr family (February 2014) had their
XML configuration files encrypted and stored as an as-
set.
Since the focus of our work is not on code-obfuscation
alone, but on its use for AV evasion and testing pur-
poses, we refer the reader interested in this subject
to [15, 23, 25].
3 State of the Art and Motivation
Christodorescu and Jha [9] in their seminal paper pro-
posed a methodology to be applied to test the robust-
ness of desktop malware detectors against obfuscating
code transformations. The authors concluded that anti-
malware tools have low resilience against offensive ob-
fuscation. In this section, we systematize the state of
the art in testing the detection rate of mobile malware
in presence of obfuscation. J. Schette and Kulicke [17]
have conducted a detailed investigation in order to bet-
ter understand how Android malware can spread. At
the same time, [17] was the first work to highlight the
technical limitations of Android AV apps.
To the best of our knowledge, the main contribu-
tions in the area of Android AV testing are by Zheng
et al. [29], Rastogi et al. [24], and more recently the
work of Maiorca et al. [20]. The common aspect of
all these contributions is that they focus primarily on
highlighting the destructive effects of offensive code ob-
fuscation against existing anti-malware apps. Rather,
we believe that the value of such comparative studies
lies in the methodology, not in the results. Indeed, the
results inherently suffer from quick obsolescence due
to the frequent signature updates and the invention of
potentially novel code-obfuscation techniques. Maiorca
et al. [20] strive to address this issue by repeating the
experiments further times to quantify the changes. Al-
though this has value, the authors do not tackle the
issue of repeatably, which in our opinion is essential for
evaluation methodologies.
In the remainder of this section, we provide a thor-
ough review and comparison of the state of the art.
ADAM. The approach presented by Zheng et al. [29]
is to generate the obfuscated variants either by directly
modifying the APK files through repackaging transfor-
mations, or by disassembling the APK files, which are
then obfuscated and re-assembled into bytecode and
re-packaged into a new, obfuscated APK file. The eval-
uation presented in Zheng et al. [29] considers 222 mal-
ware samples, from which the authors generated 1,484
variants by applying their code-transformation tech-
niques. Each variant is obtained by applying one of
the above mentioned transformations. The final testing
phase of ADAM considers two kinds of detection tools:
6ADAM DroidChameleon AAMO
Approach Characteristics Zheng et al. [29] Rastogi et al. [24] Maiorca et al. [20] (this work)
Reproducibility & Fidelity
Use of Proprietary Obfuscators 3
Based on Research Tools [19]
Thorough Implementation Details 3
Source Code Availability Upon Request [28] [22]
Obfuscated Apps Validated Can compile 3 3
Comprehensiveness
Dataset Size (# Apps) 222 12 1,497 1,260
# Obfuscation Techniques (more details be-
low)
12 8 10 17
# Anti-malware Products 11 10 13 6
Combined Transformations 3 3 3
Obfuscation Techniques Implemented
Android Specific (Section 5.1)
Repackaging 3 3 3 3
Reassembly 3 3 3 3
Re-alignment 3 3
Simple Control-flow Modifications (Section 5.2)
Junk Code Insertion 3 3
Debug Symbols Stripping 3 3
Defunct Code Insertion 3 3
Unconditional Jump Insertion 3 3
Advanced Control-flow Modifications (Section 5.3)
Call Indirection 3 3
Code Reordering 3 3
Reflection 3 3 3
Opaque Predicate Insertion 3
Renaming (Section 5.4)
Non-code files and resource renaming 3 3 3
Fields and methods renaming 3 3 3 3
Package Renaming 3 3 3 3
Encryption (Section 5.5)
Resource Encryption (asset files) 3 3
Native Code Encryption 3 3 3
Data Encryption (strings) 3 3 3 3
Class Encryption 3
Table 1 Systematization of the state of the art in comparison to this work.
the top 10 VirusTotal [5] engines and one local engine
(Antiy [1]). The results of their experiments show that
the most effective repacking transformation lower the
detection rate from 93, 78% to 82, 29%. While the ob-
fuscating transformations cause a bigger degradation of
the average detection rate that reaches in the worst case
the 50, 95%. The authors tested the top 10 detection en-
gines on VirusTotal in October and then in November
2011, then in 2012 they tested the local engine obtained
from Antiy.
The first limitation of this work is that it does not
consider combined code transformations. As a result,
it provides an overview of the effects on the detection
rate of each proposed code-transformation technique
alone but not of their combination. The second limi-
tation is given by the dimension of the dataset of ap-
plications considered in the experiments that is smaller
that the one used in subsequent works. Moreover, this
work makes extensive use of the AV engines through
the popular VirusTotal platform, which is known to the
research community for being inaccurate. Indeed, the
VirusTotal authors themselves recommend not to use
their tool to perform comparative studies. The reason
is twofold. First, VirusTotal uses the command-line ver-
sions of the desktop AV engines, which are not always
aligned. Secondly, when applied to mobile AV engines,
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VT does not use the AV applications, but only their
signatures. This does not ensure that the experiment
reflects the same detection rate that would be obtained
by using the actual AV apps.
DroidChameleon provides an implementation of dif-
ferent obfuscating transformations and classifies them
in three main groups with respect to their degree of
complexity: trivial obfuscations, obfuscations which re-
sults can be detected by tools that use data- and control-
flow analysis, and obfuscations which results cannot be
detected even when using such analysis. Rastogi et al.
have considered 8 of the most popular AV applications
(as of February 2013) and a dataset of 6 malware sam-
ples from well-known families dated back to 2011 (to
ensure that the signatures of the non-obfuscated sam-
ples are already present in the AV engines). The authors
observe that combinations of at most two transforma-
tions are sufficient to make the detection fail. However,
the lack of implementation details or source code make
this approach very hard to reproduce on a more signif-
icant dataset and therefore it is difficult to prove the
reliability of this interesting results and the scalability
of the approach. Interestingly, the DroidChameleon was
the first approach proposing to leverage the outcome of
the tests to obtain details about the kind of signatures
used by the AV engines. This idea, which is not new as
it has been proposed by Christodorescu and Jha [9] in
2004, was never applied to mobile AVs before.
Recent Work. Maiorca et al. [20] evaluated the ef-
fectiveness of existing malware detectors for Android
to code obfuscation. The authors considered the la-
beled Android Malware Genome Project dataset [30],
which contains 1,260 samples, and a portion of the
community-driven Contagio Minidump dataset [3], com-
prising 237 samples. In order to obfuscate the consid-
ered samples the proposed approach resorts to Dex-
Guard [4], a commercial, closed-source code-obfuscation
tool widely used for software protection. Out of the box,
DexGuard performs trivial obfuscations such as the re-
naming of packages, methods, classes, fields and source
files, as well as more complex transformations such as
reflection, and string and class encryption. We note that
the authors use a naif encryption algorithm (a sim-
ple XOR), whereas we consider DES, which is a more
realistic choice for encryption-based obfuscation. How-
ever, it does not perform common control code obfusca-
tions such as junk code insertion, code reordering and
opaque predicates insertion, which we consider in our
work. Whenever DexGuard failed to produce a working
executable (which questions the reproducibility of the
experimental protocol), the authors resorted to man-
ually implementing the specific obfuscation strategies
that caused errors. Unfortunately, no details nor source
code is available to document the modifications they
performed to obtain a working, obfuscated application.
As a side effect, our analysis in Table 1 may be im-
precise. What is clear is that Maiorca et al. [20] do not
consider control-flow obfuscations. The authors then re-
port the average detection rate of the different detection
tools with respect to the obfuscating transformations
used, considering multiple transformations as suggested
by Rastogi et al. [24]. The results of this recent work
prove that attackers might attain a good evasion rate,
with minimum size increment, by employing trivial ob-
fuscations and string encryption. However, the repro-
ducibility of the proposed approach is limited by the
lack of implementation details and the user of commer-
cial, closed-source tools.
4 Principles and Approach Overview
Having surveyed the state of the art, our goal is to pro-
pose a comprehensive, unified, generic, practical, and
correct methodology to test the effectiveness of Android
AV applications, in the hope that researchers and AV
developers can use it as a reference. We do not leverage
any proprietary or closed-source tool or service. Last, to
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to publish the
details of the implementation of each obfuscation oper-
ator for Android that we have developed, along with the
source code made available to the research community.
At a high level, our approach takes in input a set of
malware samples, obfuscates it and tests whether each
AV application detects the obfuscated version. This is
the general approach to testing anti-malware products.
In addition, our approach finds the shortest sequence of
obfuscation operators (applied in a predefined order),
that an attacker can create to evade an AV product.
Indeed, we apply the implemented obfuscation opera-
tors in a predefined order until the detection rate of
a product drops. Each code obfuscation performs only
one transformation and works only on the intermediate
representation in .smali. Details on the implementa-
tion of the obfuscating transformations are provided in
Section 5.
In the remainder of this section we describe the prin-
ciples at the root of our methodology and the testing
workflow.
4.1 Comprehensiveness
As summarized in Table 1, we cover the most compre-
hensive set of obfuscating techniques for Android appli-
cations proposed by far, together with all the feasible
8combinations, thus obtaining the largest set of code-
obfuscation techniques in the literature. In addition, we
are the first to propose and implement the insertion of
opaque predicates for obfuscating Android applications.
4.2 Correctness
Our approach ensures the correctness of the obfuscation
operations with respect to the original malware sample.
We consider an obfuscation operation as “successful”
only if it produces a working application, which means
that the evasion technique can be used by a malware
developer. In other words, we ensure that the seman-
tics of the original application is preserved as much as
possible and that no syntax errors are introduced. In
the Android context, this also means that the nam-
ing scheme and the directory structure must be valid
after obfuscation, including XML and other resource
files. Some of these aspects are automatically tested
by build chain tools, others are tested by the Android
Dalvik VM bytecode verifier [2] when the application is
installed onto the device. Clearly, these static analyzers
do not ensure that the behavior of the application is
preserved. To this end, we select a subset of malware
samples (from the dataset described in Section 6) and
a set of benign applications for which we have exten-
sively, manually tested that their core behaviors are not
affected by our transformations.
4.3 Reproducibility and Fidelity
Key to any (anti-malware evaluation) experiment is its
reproducibility. To this end, we do not rely on any
closed source or proprietary tool, and release the tech-
nical details and source code of our prototype. More-
over, we ensure that our testing results are as close
as possible to real conditions, that is, a malware au-
thor that uses obfuscation to evade a real anti-malware
application installed on a user’s device. To meet this
requirement, we run the unmodified versions of each
anti-malware product that we test. Previous work have
leveraged platforms such as VirusTotal, which consist
of a black-box interface that the analyst can use to test
whether a certain vendor has a signature for detecting a
given binary. However, there is no precise information
on the internals of such tools. In other words, we do
not know how they match the signatures and how the
target sample is treated. Several mobile anti-malware
applications must leverage specific functionality in or-
der to obtain a correct detection. For instance, some
malware samples are detected upon installation, others
are detected statically by inspecting the file. Therefore,
to ensure fidelity, detection must be performed as if
the anti-malware applications were running on a de-
vice. Our implementation is independent from the de-
vice, and thus can run perfectly on both physical and
virtual devices. Technically, we rely on AndroTotal, a
research tool available to the scientific community to
perform AV tests, as further described in Section 6.
4.4 Flexibility and Scalability
To be future proof with respect to potentially novel
obfuscation techniques that may be used by malware
authors, we keep our code base as lightweight as pos-
sible, making it easy to implement new obfuscations
on top of AAMO, and plug them in the framework.
Moreover, AAMO allows to combine the operators in
any possible order (although we advise for our proposed
order to minimize the amount of obfuscation operators
applied). Scalability is essential when dealing with po-
tentially large datasets of malware samples. To this end,
instead of relying on physical devices, we rely on virtual
devices. Note that emulator evasion is not a problem in
this case, because the analysis techniques applied by
the Android AV engines (as well as the obfuscation op-
erators) are fully static.
4.5 Insightfulness
In line with previous work, we believe that comparative
results are useful only if insightful. The detection rate
alone is not sufficient for the AV developer to under-
stand what made the detection engine fail. Therefore,
we apply the obfuscation operators in an order that not
only minimizes the chances of breaking the target ap-
plication, but that minimizes the length and simplicity
of the chain of operators to apply. This, in turns, min-
imizes the runtime and, most importantly, provides a
precise answer to the AV developer, about which spe-
cific obfuscation operator caused the AV to fail. In par-
ticular, from the experiments that we have conducted
we are able to identify the weaknesses of each AV that
we have considered in terms of the class of obfuscations
that make the AV fail. This allows us to provide in-
sights in how to improve the considered AV tool (see
Section 6 for details).
4.6 Workflow
Following our design principles, our methodology can
be summarized in the workflow depicted in Figure 2:
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Figure 3.1: AAMO data flow and infrastructure.Figure 2 High-level workflow overview of AAMO.
(1) Disassembling: The first phase is to disassemble
the sample file. The output of this phase is an inter-
mediate representation of the assembler-level code.
In practice, this is implemented via apktool (or
equivalent utility), which extracts resources, assets,
libraries, manifest and the DEX bytecode. The lat-
ter is then converted into its Smali representation.
(2) Obfuscating: A list of obfuscators is executed se-
quentially, and the output of each obfuscator is piped
into the next one. Each obfuscator performs only
one transformation and works only on the interme-
diate representation. The sample is obfuscated us-
ing the next obfuscators class retrieved from the set
defined in Table 1, following this order:
1. Android specific obfuscations (Section 5.1)
2. Simple control-flow obfuscations (Section 5.2)
3. Advanced control flow obfuscations (Section 5.3)
4. Renaming obfuscations (Section 5.4)
5. Resource renaming obfuscations (Section 5.4.1)
6. Resource encryption obfuscations (Section 5.5.1)
(3) Correctness Tests and Reassembling: The re-
sulting obfuscated sample in its intermediate form
is built back into a valid Android application pack-
age using apktool (in “build” mode), which is then
signed as normally.
(4) Testing: The obfuscated APK file obtained from
the previous phases is scanned with the set of AVs.
This phase is part of the workflow, but is imple-
mented outside AAMO for simplicity and flexibil-
ity. In our prototype implementation, as detailed in
Section 6, we rely on the AndroTotal research plat-
form.
The next section focuses on the set of obfuscating trans-
formations that we designed and implemented, which
form the core of AAMO.
5 Obfuscation Operators Implementation
In this section we provide details on the obfuscating
techniques that we implemented. For ease of presenta-
tion, we distinguish between five classes of obfuscators,
as summarized in Table 1 (in comparison with the sys-
tematized state of the art).
5.1 Android Specific
This class of obfuscators focuses on simple, Android-
specific code transformations that can be used to mod-
ify a file without altering its semantics. In other words,
the resulting file will have a different hash while retain-
ing the same exact functionality of the original file.
5.1.1 Repackaging
Since Android applications are packaged as compressed
archive files, and since AVs rely on their digest as a first,
nave signature, a simple obfuscation operator consists
in un-compressing the APK files, adding junk resources
(e.g., “empty” or unused files), and re-compressing the
resulting content in a new archive. This procedure cre-
ates a functionally identical APK with a different hash.
Malware authors take repackaging techniques one
step further, by embedding their malicious payload into
various benign host applications. This has the effect
of creating unique malware samples and, at the same
time, luring the victim with benign-looking “container”
applications.
5.1.2 Reassembly
Similarly to repackaging, disassembling and assembling
the DEX code (i.e., classes.dex) contained in an APK
archive has the result of creating a functionally equiva-
lent application yet with a different digest. This is due
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to the artifacts left by the disassembling process itself,
which does not produce the best optimized assembly
code, or by the representation language used (Smali, in
our case).
5.1.3 Re-aligning
Aligning an APK file means optimizing its structure so
that the resulting archive can be mapped in memory
efficiently (since Android uses memory-mapped files to
access and load APK resources). More precisely, the
convention is to align APK files to 4-byte boundaries.
As a side effect, aligning an archive produces a slightly
different file, yet with the same functionality as the orig-
inal one.
5.2 Simple Control-flow Modifications
This class of obfuscators modify the control flow by
adding new code. The goal is to evade signatures that
are based on simple fingerprints such as code size, di-
gest, symbols table content.
5.2.1 Junk Code Insertion
This classic obfuscation operator inserts no-operation
instructions (also known as “NOP”), opcode 0x00 in
Dalvik, which does nothing for one machine clock cycle.
The goal is to alter basic code signatures such as size
or digest, as well as n-gram-based ones.
Our implementation inserts a random amount of
NOPs to each method (excluding, for example, abstract
methods, which contain no instructions by definition).
5.2.2 Debug Symbols Stripping
Debug symbols are sometimes found in production re-
leases, mostly by left enabled by mistake. Debugging
statements such as .line, .source or .parameter are
used to ease debugging and help the developer by ob-
taining more verbose stack traces. This obfuscation op-
erator removes any debug directives found in the Smali
representation of the DEX bytecode.
5.2.3 Defunct Code Insertion
As part of the detection signatures, some products rely
on the names of the methods and classes declared in
the DEX file. The goal of this obfuscation operator is
to evade such signatures by altering method and class
names.
To this end, we randomly generate method or class
names. Once we find a non-existing one, we insert it
right after the #direct methods annotation. We gen-
erate the inserted code so as not to alter any part of
the existing symbols and code.
.method public static FogLow(Ljava/lang/String;
L java/lang/String;)V
.registers 2
.prologue
invoke-static {p0, p1},
Landroid/util/Log;->d(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)I
return-void
.end method
Listing 1 Defunct method example.
.class public final L<ClassName>;
.super Ljava/lang/Object;
.source "<ClassName>.java"
# direct methods
.method public static FogLow(Ljava/lang/String;L ⤦Ç java/lang/String;)V
.registers 2
.prologue
invoke-static {p0, p1}, ⤦Ç Landroid/util/Log;->d(Ljava/lang/String; ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/String;)I
return-void
.end method
.method public static <MethodName >()V v0, "<String1>"
.locals 2
const-string
const-string
.prologue
invoke-static {v0, v1}, L<ClassName>;->FogLow(v1, ⤦Ç "<String2>" Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
return-void
.end method
Listing 2 Defunct class example.
5.2.4 Unconditional Jump Insertion
To further alter the control-flow structure, we insert
forward and backward unconditional jumps, so as not
to alter the code semantics. In the JVM or Dalvik VM,
unconditional jumps are implemented with a go-to in-
struction (which has no higher-level equivalent in Java).
We rely on the goto/32 instruction, which gives the
widest address range. More precisely, we add a first
goto/32 instruction at the very beginning of the body
of each, right after the .prologue annotation. This first
instruction jumps at the end of the method’s body, af-
ter the return instruction. Right after this location we
insert another goto/32 that jumps back at the begin-
ning of the method’s body, such that to skip the first
jump. The methods affected by this operator are ran-
domly selected.
.method public FogLow(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V
# ...preamble...
.prologue
goto/32 :GoToFogEnd
:GoToFogBeg
# ...body...
return-void
:GoToFogEnd
goto/32 :GoToFogBeg
.end method
Listing 3 Unconditional jump insertion example.
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5.3 Advanced Control-flow Modifications
This class of obfuscators alters the control flow signif-
icantly by adding new branches or modifying existing
ones, and by leveraging reflection. Note that we are the
first to port opaque predicates to the DEX architecture.
5.3.1 Call Indirection
This obfuscator aims to evade signatures based on the
application’s call graph. In practice, we redirect each
method call to proxy methods that call the original
method. These proxies share the same prototype of
the original method, including parameters order and
type, return type, invocation type, and registers. Re-
turn values, if any, are returned by the proxy methods.
Each proxy method is a public static method, added
right after the #direct methods annotation, with a
unique randomized identifier. To increase randomness,
we detour multiple calls to the same method to distinct
proxies. We apply this obfuscator to framework-library
and intra-application calls (excluding constructors and
static initializers).
.class public final L<ClassName>;
.super Ljava/lang/Object;
.source "<ClassName>.java"
# direct methods
.method public static <Identifier>(Ljava/lang/String;L ⤦Ç java/lang/String;)I
.registers 3
.prologue
invoke-static {p0, p1}, ⤦Ç Landroid/util/Log;->d(Ljava/lang/String; ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/String;)I
move-result v0
return v0
.end method
.method public static FogLow(Ljava/lang/String;L ⤦Ç java/lang/String;)V
.registers 2
.prologue
invoke-static {p0, p1}, ⤦Ç L<ClassName>;-><Identifier>(Ljava/lang/String; ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/String;)I
return-void
.end method
Listing 4 Call indirection.
5.3.2 Code Reordering
This obfuscator changes the static order of some in-
structions without changing the runtime execution flow
of the original program. The goal is to evade signatures
based on the order of instructions or DEX opcodes (e.g.,
n-grams). In each method body, we group instructions
into uniquely labeled basic blocks. We then shuﬄe the
resulting basic blocks and insert unconditional jumps
between them to preserve the original execution se-
quence.
5.3.3 Reflection
We enhance the power of the code-reordering operator
by implementing reflection-based obfuscation (which we
also apply alone). Essentially, reflection means execut-
ing code which location in memory is determined at
runtime (e.g., C function pointers, Java reflect API,
Android dynamic code loading API). This obfuscation
operator replaces static method calls to reflection calls,
by loading the target method’s name into a string on
which the java.lang.reflect.Method.invoked() is
then called.
.class public final L<ClassName>;
.super Ljava/lang/Object;
.source "<ClassName >.java"
# direct methods
const v0, 0x2
new-array v1, v0, [Ljava/lang/Class;
new-array v2, v0, [Ljava/lang/Object;
const v0, 0x0
const-class v3, Ljava/lang/String;
aput-object v3, v1, v0
aput-object p0, v2, v0
const v0, 0x1
const-class v3, Ljava/lang/String;
aput-object v3, v1, v0
aput-object p1, v2, v0
const-string v0, "FogLow"
const-class v3, L<ClassName>;
invoke-virtual {v3, v0, v1}, ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/Class;->getMethod(Ljava/lang/String; ⤦Ç [Ljava/lang/Class;)L java/lang/reflect/Method;
move-result-object v0
invoke-virtual {v0, v3, v2}, ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/reflect/Method;->invoke( ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/Object; [Ljava/lang/Object;)
move-result-object v0
return-void
.end method
.method public static FogLow(Ljava/lang/String; ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/String;)V
.registers 2
.prologue
invoke-static {p0, p1}, ⤦Ç Landroid/util/Log;->d(Ljava/lang/String; ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/String;)I
return-void
.end method
.method public static <MethodName>()V
.locals 2
const-string v0, "<String1>"
const-string v1, "<String2>"
.prologue
invoke-static {v0, v1}, ⤦Ç L<ClassName>;-><RndMethodName>(Ljava/lang/String; ⤦Ç Ljava/lang/String;)V
return-void
.end method
Listing 5 Reflection example.
5.3.4 Opaque Predicate Insertion
Opaque predicates are conditional expressions whose
constant value is known by the obfuscator while it is
difficult for a compiler or static analyzer to deduce.
Opaque predicates insertion aims at confusing static
analysis tools that, not being aware of the constant
value of the inserted opaque predicate, erroneously see
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both branches as possible (even if one is never executed
at run time). For example, the developer could insert
a condition on a function’s return value. In practice,
we implement this operator by setting two constant in-
teger values in the first two local registries v0 and v1
of the method. We set these values randomly (above
zero). Then, we append simple arithmetic instructions
(e.g., add-int, rem-int) on these values, such that the
outcome is always greater than zero. Using the if-gtz
instruction (if greater than zero) we instruct the ma-
chine to execute a chain of unconditional jumps (imple-
mented with the goto/32 instruction), ending up to the
function return instruction. The “else” branch is never
executed. We apply this obfuscation only to methods
with two or more local parameters.
5.4 Renaming
This class of obfuscators aims at evading signatures
based on the presence of specific strings. This applies
to non-code files (e.g., resources, assets) and code files
(e.g., fields, classes, or methods names).
5.4.1 Non-code Files and Resource Renaming
Although we place this sub-class of obfuscators under
the “renaming” umbrella, we discovered that it is effec-
tive enough even if employed alone. Therefore, in our
experiments we treat it separately from the other re-
naming obfuscators.
This obfuscators parses the resource names from the
XML files extracted from the APK, and replaces user-
defined resource identifiers with the first eight charac-
ters of the MD5 of the identifier string, while updating
references accordingly (including filename-based identi-
fiers, for which it renames the respective files). In order
to evade signatures based on the entire resource table,
this obfusction operator adds a random number of use-
less resource IDs (generated by following the platform
constraints).
If the developer of the targeted APK relies on the
unique integer ID through a subclass of the R class to
access resources—as suggested by the Android devel-
opers guide—no further change is required. However,
if resources are referenced, inside the executable code,
by their identifier, inconsistency issues arises. In these
cases, we inject also a call to the Android framework
method that is used to obtain a resource unique integer
ID from its identifier.
5.4.2 Identifier Renaming
This obfuscator replaces each field, method or class
name (called “identifier” from hereon) with the first
eight characters of the MD5 of the identifier string it-
self. We rename the references accordingly, by changing
the arguments passed to the (i|s)get-*, (i|s)put-*,
and invoke-* instructions. In order to evade signatures
based on the symbol table, we add to each class a ran-
dom number of useless copies of the last field, with ran-
domized unique identifiers. We use UTF-8 encoding in
order to cope with Unicode identifiers, and pre pend an
alphabetical character so as to generate a valid identi-
fier. We propagate the renaming to the XML resource
files and Android manifest, which may refer to class
names.
5.4.3 Package Renaming
In the Java language, package names are a mechanism
for organizing classes into name spaces. Developers typ-
ically use package names to organize classes belonging
to the same category or providing similar functional-
ity. Classes in the same package can access each other
package-restricted members.
Packages are usually defined using a dot-separated
hierarchy. In the smali representation, each class is ref-
erenced by pre pending the complete path of its pack-
age, with the forward slash instead of the dot. For
example the java.lang.String class is referenced as
Ljava/lang/String in Smali, reflecting the directory
structure.
Each Android application declares, within its man-
ifest file, the application’s package name. This global
package name serves as a unique identifier for the appli-
cation (and as the default name for the application pro-
cess). Certain applications marketplaces enforce that
apps should have distinct package names. Given the
central role of package names in identifying Android
applications, many AVs use the package name string in
their signatures.
This operator obfuscates changes the package struc-
ture of the application, including the Android pack-
age name definition, by renaming package identifiers,
as well as the metadata (i.e., labels of application, ac-
tivities, services, providers, receivers, intent filters, per-
missions, and actions) declared in the manifest file. In
other words, this obfuscator performs a complete refac-
toring of the application code’s name spaces. More pre-
cisely, it replaces the package name identifier with the
first eight characters of the MD5 digest of the original
identifier, taking care of propagating the change to any
referring code.
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5.5 Encryption
AV signatures are heavily based on sequences of bytes.
Therefore, encrypting files or code in an application
changes its bytes entirely. Encryption can thus poten-
tially evade all the aforementioned signatures.
All the obfuscation operators described in this sec-
tion follow a simple schema: They encrypt the target
object with a symmetric yet non trivial encryption al-
gorithm (in our case, DES), and then overrides the An-
droid framework methods required to access the en-
crypted target object. The overridden methods begin
with a proper decryption routine that is invoked every
time an object is accessed by the application.
The decryption occurs always at runtime and so this
obfuscation evades detection signatures that relies on
resources content in order to build their signatures.
5.5.1 Resource Encryption (asset files)
File and path names are renamed to the MD5 of their
string values and the raw objects are encrypted. Since
the AssetManager class cannot be overridden, we locate
each call to the AssetManager.open framework method
and redirect them to a proper proxy method that we
inject, which takes care of the decryption.
5.5.2 Native Code Encryption
Similarly to the previous obfuscator, we rename native
code files and encrypt them. Also in this case we inject a
proper proxy method to which we forward the calls orig-
inally directed to System.load (this way, we also inter-
cept calls originating from its wrapper loadLibrary).
5.5.3 Data Encryption (strings)
This obfuscator provides string resource value encryp-
tion. The value of each string resource, plural string
resource and string array resource, is replaced with its
DES encrypted value.
6 Experimental Validation
In this section we describe how we have validated our
unified methodology on a real-world use case, that is
for testing the resilience of some of the major existing
anti-malware products for Android against the compre-
hensive obfuscation operators that we implemented. In
the remainder of this section we describe and justify
our choice of dataset, present the obtained results, and
provide a thorough discussion.
6.1 Dataset
Despite the availability of sample data sources such as
VirusTotal, AndroTotal and Contagio Minidump, the
Android Malware Genome Project [30] is the only cu-
rated dataset produced by the academic community.
This dataset contains 1,260 well-organized malware sam-
ples that, comprising 49 malware families, cover the
majority of existing Android malware families with het-
erogeneous characteristics and malicious behaviors. The
dataset was collected between August 2010 and Octo-
ber 2011. Therefore, we are positive that AV vendors
had enough time to update their signatures. All sam-
ples are proved to be malware by both automated and
manual analysis.
Since our focus is not of comparing a large number
of AV engines, but rather to show how methodology
can be applied in practice, we selected the top 6 free
AV applications available on the Google Play Store, as
summarized in Table 6.4. We updated the malware sig-
natures before the execution of our tests, on the same
day, 01/27/2014.
6.2 Test Automation
To ensure reproducibility and fidelity of the results,
(main characteristics of our methodology), we leverage
AndroTotal, a research platform to automate Android
anti-malware scans, in which tests are performed by
simulating a real user’s behavior when using an anti-
malware app. AndroTotal [19] supports various AV ap-
plications and multiple Android platform versions. By
providing an APK as input, AndroTotal produces the
labels of the detected malware variant (if any), and the
scanning time. Using AndroTotal allowed us to focus
our efforts on the overall methodology, while being con-
fident that scanning results are obtained with a rigor-
ous and robust scientific method, already vetted by the
research community.
We have performed our experiments on a specific
target version of the Android Jelly Bean v4.1.x API
level 16, which is among the top five most used versions.
6.3 Resource Requirements and Speed
For the obfuscation phase we used modest resources
(a 4-cores machine with 8GB of memory). Our AAMO
prototype took about 2 seconds to run the Android spe-
cific and the simple control-flow obfuscators, about 50
seconds when adding the advanced control-flow opera-
tors, and approximately 100 seconds with resource re-
naming and encryption activated. To run the full chain
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Figure 6.7: Mean time of scanning grouped by the outcome of the scan (drawn from
Table6.7).
is detected are significantly greater then the ones when a threat is detected.
8 —Where the detection time of detected samples remain quite constant, the
time of detection failure fluctuates. This happens mainly because the malware
samples that are still undetected after applying control flow obfuscation have a
flat application structure, they usually have meaningful resources/assets but are
architecturally simple. This is why the detection engines take less time while
scanning, simple matching on strings and filenames and fingerprinting asset-
s/resources files are a lightweight task with respect to analyzing the structure
of the application itself.
Comparing the scanning time of detected samples with undetected ones we
can infer that a sequential approach is mainly employed, the detection process
stops at the first matching signature.
Table 6.7: Mean time of scanning grouped by the outcome of the scan.
Type Original Trivial Basic Advanced Renaming Resource Encryption
Detected 01m12s 01m39s 01m45s 01m35s 01m40s 01m37s -
Undetected 01m56s 03m39s 03m41s 02m53s 02m39s 02m30s 02m43s
Original Android Sp.    Simple CF    Adv. CF    Renaming    Resource Ren.    Encrypt.
Figure 3 Average detection time by the outcome of the scan.
of obfuscators, AAMO never took more than 200 sec-
onds.
We llocated slightly more resources to AndroTo-
tal (an 8-cores machine with 16GB of memory). On
averag , t e time required for scanning an obfuscated
sample was 100 to 300 seconds, and increasing with
the number of obufscations applied. This is because a
non-matched signature is more likely than a matched
signature if the sample is obfuscated, as summarized in
Figure 3.
6.4 Discussion of Results
In the following we present our experimental results. To
show how our methodology is insightful, we discus how
the obfuscation operator that caused the failure of an
AV is an indicator of the weaknesses of the signatures
behind the AV. For instance, this information could be
used by the vendors as regression tests.
Table 3 shows the detection rate profile of the anti-
malware tools that we tested, along the obfuscation
chain. In particular, the table reports for each anti-
malware tool its average detection rate with respect
to the different class of obfuscation considered in the
testing methodology. This value is computed as the av-
erage of the corresponding detection rates of the anti-
malware for each malware family in the data-set. If the
average detection rate is 0.00%, we denote it with “7.”
For example, the average detection rate of the Dr. Web
AV is 96.74% when applied to non-obfuscated malware,
85.78% when Android specific obfuscations are applied,
81.25% when the samples are further obfuscated with
basic control flow obfuscations, and drops to 33.53%
Vendor Package Name Version Downloads
Avast com.avast.android.mobilesecurity 2.0.3917 100k
Norton com.symantec.mobilesecurity 3.3.4.970 50k
Dr. Web com.drweb 7.00.3 50k
Kaspersky com.kms.free 10.4.41 10k
Trend Micro com.trendmicro.tmmspersonal 3.1 5k
Zoner com.zoner.android.antivirus 1.8.0 5k
Table 2 AV applications used for our experimental evalua-
tion.
when advanced control flow obfuscations are applied.
Table 4, in the appendix, describes in more details the
results of our experiments by showing the profile of the
average detection rate of the each anti-malware on the
malware families considered in the dataset. When ap-
plicable, we re-run the experiment by enabling only the
obfuscator that has caused the drop, and add the pre-
ceding ones, one at a time, until a comparable drop oc-
curs again. In this way we ensure that the shortest and
most effective sequence of operators is found. Observe
that during our experiments we distinguish between re-
naming and resource renaming. This is because we have
observed that these obfuscating transformations may
influence in different ways the detection rate of an anti-
malware tool (e.g., Avast is able to handle renaming
but not resource renaming). Moreover, none of the con-
sidered anti-malware tools is able to detect a malware
sample that employs resource encryption.
The last line of Table 3 summarizes our results as
the average detection rate. In the following we discuss
the detection profile of each detection tool, to provide
an example of how the AAMO methodology can be
applied in practice.
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Figure 6.6: Avast anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples (drawn from Table6.6).
Overall
3 —Looking at overall detection rates we can notice that the 19% (1,436 out of
7,554) of the signature could be defeated applying simple trivial transformations.
4 —The 31% (2,342 out of 7,554) of the signatures relays on resources/assets
name and content.
5 —The 88% (6,648 out of 7,554) of the signatures do not relays on static
analysis of the bytecode. Only two of anti-malware tools we have tested are
employing static analysis (Dr. Web and TrendMicro).
Malware categories
6 —Grouping the results by malware categories as defined in Section 5.2 do
not disclose any interesting pattern. This observation allow us to confirm that
any of the tested anti-virus tools is doing any type of behavioural analysis of
the samples.
Performance
The scan time, reported in Table 6.7 give us two insight:
7 —The anti-malware scans are executed sequentially, they stops when the
first detection signature is matched. This is why the time elapsed when no threat
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Android specific transformations and control flow
obfuscations have no effect on the detection rate of
Avast, that after applying these obfuscation is still of
96.51%. We argue that the signature used by this AV
us s static analysis techniques in order to handle mod-
ifications of the control flow graph. Renaming causes
a significant drop in the detection rate that reaches
the 60.29%. From this fact, under a black-box assump-
tion, we can conclude that Avast employs some sort
of name-based matching that, in our experiments, suc-
ceeds in detecting only 60.29% of the samples. On the
o e hand, since the detecti n rate drops to 10.25% when
resource renaming is applied, we conclude that Avast
heavily relies on asset names. On the other hand, fur-
ther experiments showed that when code renaming and
encryption are applied together (without resource re-
naming), Avast reaches 36.22% detection, showing that
code name-based features are also given importance.
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Cumulative Obfuscation Transformation
Vendor Original +Android Specific +Simple CF +Advanced CF +Renaming +Resource Ren. +Encryption
Avast 98.17% 98.17% 98.17% 96.51% 60.29% 10.25% 7
Norton 98.01% 97.62% 97.62% 97.54% 20.04% 7 7
Dr. Web 96.74% 85.78% 81.25% 33.52% 32.49% 33.12% 7
Kaspersky 97.70% 97.22% 96.82% 92.77% 45.51% 33.60% 7
Trend Micro 96.98% 73.95% 71.64% 49.96% 49.72% 49.72% 7
Zoner 98.01% 20.02% 20.02% 20.02% 20.02% 7 7
Overall 97.60% 78.79% 77.59% 65.05% 39.34% 21.11% 7
Table 3 Detection rate of obfuscated malware samples after applying the list of obfuscators described in Section 5. Note that
we differentiate between resource renaming and (generic) renaming.
6.4.2 Norton
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Figure 6.5: Norton anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples (drawn from Table6.5).
Avast
Avast has the profile described in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Avast anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples.
Original Trivial Basic Advanced Renaming Resource Encryption
98.17% 98.17% 98.17% 96.51% 60.29% 10.25% 0.00%
For the 36.22% (456 samples) of malware samples we have tested, applying
code identifiers renaming and string encryption can evade the detection. Trivial
transformations and also basic and advanced control flow obfuscators has no
e↵ect at all.
Avast also employs resources/assets names matching on 60.29% (759 sam-
ples) of the samples.
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Android specific transformation and control flow ob-
fuscations (both basic and advanced) have little effect
on t e detection rate of Norton, that after applying
these obfuscation is still of 97.54%. Thus, we argue that
the signatures are b sed on static analysis techniq es
that make it resilient to modifications of the control
flow graph. Renaming obfuscatio s have an importan
impact on the detection rate that drops to 20.04% In
our experiments we also observed that the 69.50% of
malware samples we have tested can evade detection by
applying only code identifiers renaming and string en-
cryption. Moreover, by manually dissecting these sam-
ples we have confirmed that the detection is based o
code identifiers. The use of symbolic names (e.g., vari-
able names) as a detection criterion, as opposed to the
actual names, would reduce these false negatives.
The contribution of renaming is generally substan-
tial, but resource renaming obfuscation alone is not suf-
ficient. For example, we applied only resource renaming
and found out, by manual inspection, that 28.04% of
the samples were still detected because of their package
name.
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Figure 6.4: Dr. Web anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples (drawn from Table6.4).
Norton
Norton has the profile described in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Norton anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples.
Original Trivial Basic Advanced Renaming Resource Encryption
98.01% 97.62% 97.62% 97.54% 28.04% 0.00% 0.00%
For the 69.50% (875 samples) of malware samples we have tested, applying
code identifiers renaming and string encryption can evade the detection. By
manually dissecting these samples we have discovered that the detection is based
only on code identifiers.
Trivial transformations and also basic and advanced control flow obfuscators
has no e↵ect at all.
By manually dissecting malware samples still detected by Norton, we have
discovered that the detection is done also matching the application package
name on 28.04% (353 samples) of the samples.
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The application of Android specific transformations
has a significant pact (from 96.74% t 85.78%). In-
deed, 10.96% of samples in our dataset can evade detec-
tion by applying Android specific transformations. This
suggests that Dr. Web relies on syntactic features. Ba-
sic control flow obfuscations have little effect (-4.53%),
while advanced control flow obfuscations cause a 47.73%
detection rate drop. So we argue that Dr. Web relies on
some static analysis of the bytecode, which makes it re-
silient to basic control-flow obfuscation. However, more
sophisticated analysis techniques should be employed
by this product in order to identify opaque predicates
and similar artifacts introduced by our advanced obfus-
cator.
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Figure 6.3: Kaspersky anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples (drawn from Table6.3).
Dr. Web
Dr. Web has the profile described in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Dr. Web anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples.
Original Trivial Basic Advanced Renaming Resource Encryption
96.74% 85.78% 81.25% 33.52% 32.49% 33.12% 0.00%
For the 10.96% (138 samples) of malware samples we have tested, applying
a simple trivial transformation can evade the detection.
The basic control flow graph obfuscators class has a little e↵ect in decreasing
the detection rate, as small as 4.53% (57 samples), while the advanced one
provides a significant drop of 47.73% (601 samples). So we can assert that
Dr. Web also employs some sort of signatures based on static analysis of the
bytecode.
By manually dissecting malware samples still detected by Dr. Web we have
discovered that the detection also employs resources/assets contents matching
on the 33.12% (417 samples) of samples.
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Android specific transformation and control flow ob-
fuscations (both basic and advanced) have little effect
on the detection rate, which is still 92.77% after ob-
fuscation. Instead, renaming obfuscations cause a sig-
nificant drop in the detection rate (from 92.77% to
16
45.51%). Then, when applying resource renaming, we
reach 33.60%, which becomes zero when encryption is
used. By analyzing the contribution of each specific ob-
fuscator, we found out that 47.26% of the samples can
evade detection by applying only code-identifier renam-
ing and string encryption.
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Figure 6.2: Trend Micro anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfus-
cated malware samples (drawn from Table6.2).
Kaspersky
Kaspersky has the profile described in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Kaspersky anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples.
Original Trivial Basic Advanced Renaming Resource Encryption
97.70% 97.22% 96.82% 92.77% 45.51% 33.60% 0.00%
For the 47.26% (595 samples) of malware samples we have tested, applying a
code identifier renaming and string encryption can evade the detection. Trivial
transformations and also basic and advanced control flow obfuscators has no
e↵ect at all.
Kaspersky also employs resources/assets names matching on 45.51% (573
samples) of the samples.
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Android specific transformations have significant im-
pact (from 96.98% to 73.95%). Basic control flow ob-
fuscations have little effect (-2.31%), where advanced
control flow obfuscations cause a 21.68% detection rate
dro . Thus, we can assert that Trend Micro employs
some sort of signatures based on static analysis of the
bytecode that makes it resilient to some of the changes
of the control flow gr ph. Howe er, give the success
of our advanced control-flow obfuscators, more sophis-
ticated analysis techniques should be empl yed by this
product in order to identify opaque predicates and sim-
ilar artifacts. Renaming has no effect at all. This could
be explained by the fact that the detection engine may
leverage signatures on the content of assets and resource
files.
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Figure 6.1: Zoner anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples (drawn from Table6.1).
Trend Micro
Trend Micro has the profile described in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Trend Micro anti-malware: profile of overall detection rate with obfuscated
malware samples.
Original Trivial Basic Advanced Renaming Resource Encryption
96.98% 73.95% 71.64% 49.96% 49.72% 49.72% 0.00%
For the 23.03% (290 samples) of malware samples we have tested, applying
a simple trivial transformation can evade the detection.
The basic control flow graph obfuscators class has a little e↵ect in decreasing
the detection rate, as small as 2.31% (29 samples) while the advanced one
provides a significant drop of 21.68% (273 samples). So we can assert that
Trend Micro also employs some sort of signatures based on static analysis of the
bytecode.
Identifier renaming and string encryption obfuscators has no e↵ect at all.
The Trend Micro detection engine leverage also a signature on content of
assets/resources files 49.72% (626 samples), in order to detect a malicious ap-
plication.
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We observe that the average detection rate of Zoner
drops from 98.01% to 20.02% when applying Android
specific transformations. This suggests that Zoner heav-
ily relies on syntactic features. Indeed, by manual anal-
ysis we have discovered that the 77.99% drop is due to
naive detection base on a digest of the APK file or on
its cryptographic signature. It is clear that this makes
Zon r very sensitive to ny trivial transform tion (e.g.,
repacking, reassembly, re-aligning). Basic and advanced
control flow obfuscations seem to have to effect at all,
whereas the detection rate breaks down to zero when
the renaming of resources is applied.
7 Conclusions
In the seminal paper by Christodorescu and Jha [9], the
authors tested the resilience of desktop anti-malware
tools against obfuscation. Their experiments showed
that desktop malware detectors were not able to recog-
nize obfuscated malware variants. In a similar vein the
results obtained by Zheng et al. [29], Rastogi et al. [24]
and Maiorca et al. [20], focus on showing that mobile
malware detectors are not able to recognize obfuscated
Android malware variants.
Our viewpoint is that, nowadays, these results are
not surprising. They are clearly valuable to raise aware-
ness among the vendors of anti-malware products. How-
ever, with this work we underline the importance of
reproducibility in this research line. Reproducibility is
essential to all research areas, and in particular to ap-
plied malware analysis.
Our response to the problem is toward ensuring re-
producible AV testing. Rather than focusing our work
on the results, we propose and release the implementa-
tion of a unified methodology (that takes into account
the outcome of our systematization work) so that re-
searchers and vendors can repeat the experiments au-
tonomously, and keep on improving their prototypes
and products. The main goal of this work was to pro-
pose and develop a reproducible and flexible framework
for the analysis of Android AVs against obfuscation. As
such, our focus was on the methodology, rather than on
the single obfuscators, on which there is ample litera-
ture. Clearly, the class of obfuscating transformations
offered by our current implementation of AAMO can
be extended. For example, by implementing more so-
phisticated obfuscations that perform code and more
advanced opaque predicates insertion. We have also val-
idate our methodology in practice, to show that it can
be used to produce results along the line of previous
work, but we make a step further, following an open
approach, and providing details and source code of our
prototype. Observe that our validation has been done
with respect to a specific order of the classes of obfus-
cations implemented in AAMO. Researches can decide
to preform the validation of the AV product of interest
considering also different orderings of the obfuscations
and see how this affects detection.
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Table 4: Detection rates of obfuscated malware samples.
Family Product Android Sp. Simple CF Adv. CF Renaming Resource Ren. Encrypt.
ADRD
(2011-02)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 81.82% 86.36% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 95.45% 95.45% 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 7 7
AnserverBot
(2011-09)
Avast 3 3 99.47% 98.93% 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 88.24% 7 7
Dr. Web 90.37% 88.77% 96.26% 94.65% 97.33% 7
Kaspersky 3 99.47% 3 98.93% 99.47% 7
Trend Micro 99.47% 99.47% 99.47% 99.47% 99.47% 7
Zoner 1.60% 1.60% 1.60% 1.60% 7 7
Asroot
(2011-09)
Avast 3 3 3 3 3 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 62.50% 3 3 3 3 7
Kaspersky 87.50% 3 3 3 3 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
BaseBridge
(2011-06)
Avast 99.18% 99.18% 99.18% 97.54% 49.18% 7
Norton 99.18% 99.18% 99.18% 36.89% 7 7
Dr. Web 82.79% 7.05% 87.70% 85.25% 90.98% 7
Kaspersky 99.18% 99.18% 98.36% 96.72% 95.08% 7
Trend Micro 95.08% 95.08% 95.08% 95.08% 95.08% 7
Zoner 4.10% 4.10% 4.10% 4.10% 7 7
BeanBot
(2011-10)
Avast 87.50% 87.50% 87.50% 7 7 7
Norton 87.50% 87.50% 87.50% 87.50% 7 7
Dr. Web 62.50% 62.50% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 5.00% 87.50% 5.00% 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
BgServ
(2011-03)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 3 7 7
Dr. Web 7.78% 88.89% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 88.89% 88.89% 88.89% 88.89% 7 7
CoinPirate
(2011-08)
Avast 3 3 3 7 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 7 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
CruseWin
(2011-07)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 3 7 7
Dr. Web 50.00% 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
DogWars
(2011-08)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
DroidCoupon
(2011-09)
Avast 3 3 3 3 3 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 3 3 3 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 3 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
DroidDeluxe
(2011-09)
Avast 3 3 3 3 3 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
20
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Dr. Web 3 3 7 3 3 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 3 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
DroidDream
(2011-03)
Avast 87.50% 87.50% 87.50% 81.25% 81.25% 7
Norton 87.50% 87.50% 87.50% 81.25% 7 7
Dr. Web 81.25% 81.25% 81.25% 5.00% 5.00% 7
Kaspersky 87.50% 87.50% 87.50% 87.50% 81.25% 7
Trend Micro 81.25% 81.25% 81.25% 81.25% 81.25% 7
Zoner 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 7 7
DroidDreamLight
(2011-05)
Avast 97.83% 97.83% 95.65% 32.61% 7 7
Norton 97.83% 97.83% 97.83% 7 7 7
Dr. Web 93.48% 89.13% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 97.83% 97.83% 91.30% 28.26% 7 7
Trend Micro 97.83% 86.96% 2.17% 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
DroidKungFu1
(2011-06)
Avast 3 3 97.06% 97.06% 7 7
Norton 97.06% 97.06% 97.06% 2.94% 7 7
Dr. Web 3.53% 82.35% 97.06% 3 94.12% 7
Kaspersky 3 94.12% 97.06% 3 3 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 44.12% 44.12% 44.12% 44.12% 7 7
DroidKungFu2
(2011-07)
Avast 3 3 3 3 3 7
Norton 3 3 3 43.33% 7 7
Dr. Web 90.00% 86.67% 3 3 96.67% 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 3 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 7 7
DroidKungFu3
(2011-08)
Avast 99.35% 99.35% 99.03% 4.85% 7 7
Norton 99.35% 99.35% 99.03% 7 7 7
Dr. Web 89.64% 83.17% 1.94% 1.94% 1.94% 7
Kaspersky 98.38% 97.41% 87.38% 7 7 7
Trend Micro 65.05% 62.14% 36.57% 35.92% 35.92% 7
Zoner 32.36% 32.36% 32.36% 32.36% 7 7
DroidKungFu4
(2011-10)
Avast 93.75% 93.75% 93.75% 91.67% 7 7
Norton 93.75% 93.75% 93.75% 7 7 7
Dr. Web 82.29% 67.71% 4.17% 4.17% 4.17% 7
Kaspersky 93.75% 92.71% 88.54% 7 7 7
Trend Micro 93.75% 93.75% 93.75% 93.75% 93.75% 7
Zoner 18.75% 18.75% 18.75% 18.75% 7 7
DroidKungFuSapp
(2011-10)
Avast 3 3 3 7 7 7
Norton 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 7 7 7
Dr. Web 7 7 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 7 7 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
DroidKungFuUpdate
(2011-10)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 7 7 7 7 7 7
Dr. Web 7 7 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 7 7 7 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
Endofday
(2011-05)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 3 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
FakeNetflix
(2011-10)
Avast 3 3 3 7 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
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Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
FakePlayer
(2010-08)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 83.33% 3 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
GamblerSMS
(2011-07)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
Geinimi
(2010-12)
Avast 91.18% 91.18% 91.18% 66.18% 1.47% 7
Norton 91.18% 91.18% 91.18% 47.06% 7 7
Dr. Web 83.82% 6.47% 1.47% 1.47% 1.47% 7
Kaspersky 88.24% 91.18% 85.29% 57.35% 1.47% 7
Trend Micro 83.82% 3.53% 1.47% 1.47% 1.47% 7
Zoner 66.18% 66.18% 66.18% 66.18% 7 7
GGTracker
(2011-06)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 3 3 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
GingerMaster
(2011-08)
Avast 3 3 3 3 3 7
Norton 3 3 3 3 7 7
Dr. Web 50.00% 3 3 3 3 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 3 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
GoldDream
(2011-07)
Avast 95.74% 95.74% 59.57% 59.57% 7 7
Norton 95.74% 95.74% 95.74% 7 7 7
Dr. Web 6.60% 6.60% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 95.74% 93.62% 89.36% 59.57% 7 7
Trend Micro 80.85% 61.70% 7 7 7 7
Zoner 29.79% 29.79% 29.79% 29.79% 7 7
Gone60
(2011-09)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 3 7 7
Dr. Web 66.67% 7.78% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
GPSSMSSpy
(2010-08)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
HippoSMS
(2011-07)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
Jifake
(2011-10)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 7 7 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 7 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
jSMSHider
(2011-06)
Avast 3 3 3 7 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
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Dr. Web 3 93.75% 3 87.50% 93.75% 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 3 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
KMin
(2011-10)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 88.46% 7 7
Dr. Web 84.62% 69.23% 1.92% 1.92% 1.92% 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 1.92% 1.92% 7
Trend Micro 3 3 1.92% 1.92% 1.92% 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
LoveTrap
(2011-07)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 3 7 7
Dr. Web 3 7 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
NickyBot
(2011-08)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
NickySpy
(2011-07)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 3 7 7
Dr. Web 3 50.00% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
Pjapps
(2011-02)
Avast 96.55% 96.55% 96.55% 7 7 7
Norton 96.55% 96.55% 96.55% 7 7 7
Dr. Web 9.31% 82.76% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 91.38% 89.66% 89.66% 7 1.72% 7
Trend Micro 43.10% 44.83% 7 7 7 7
Zoner 25.86% 25.86% 25.86% 25.86% 7 7
Plankton
(2011-06)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 2.73% 2.73% 2.73% 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 2.73% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 3 3 3 3 7 7
RogueLemon
(2011-10)
Avast 3 3 3 50.00% 7 7
Norton 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
RogueSPPush
(2011-08)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 7.78% 55.56% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 88.89% 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 66.67% 7 7
SMSReplicator
(2010-11)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 3 7 7
Dr. Web 7 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
SndApps
(2011-07)
Avast 3 3 3 7 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
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Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
Spitmo
(2011-09)
Avast 3 3 3 7 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 7 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
TapSnake
(2010-08)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 50.00% 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 50.00% 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
Walkinwat
(2011-03)
Avast 3 3 3 7 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 7 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
YZHC
(2011-06)
Avast 3 3 3 45.45% 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 4.55% 7 7
Dr. Web 90.91% 81.82% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 95.45% 4.55% 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
zHash
(2011-03)
Avast 3 3 3 3 3 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 81.82% 81.82% 3 3 90.91% 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 3 3 7
Trend Micro 3 3 3 3 3 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zitmo
(2011-07)
Avast 3 3 3 3 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 3 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 7 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zsone
(2011-05)
Avast 3 3 3 66.67% 7 7
Norton 3 3 3 7 7 7
Dr. Web 3 83.33% 7 7 7 7
Kaspersky 3 3 3 7 7 7
Trend Micro 7 7 7 7 7 7
Zoner 7 7 7 7 7 7
